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in the European Union:
E Pluribus Unum or Ex Uno Plures?
ANDREW CHARLESWORTH*
Introduction
In mid-2002, the Commission of the European Union ("EU")
initiated a review' of the operation of the 1995 Data Protection
Directive ("DPD"), 2 which the fifteen EU Member States were to
have implemented into their national laws by October 1998. It might
seem strange to the casual observer for there to be a wide-ranging
review of the impact of a piece of legislation that was barely six years
old, and which had been implemented in most of the Member States
for considerably under three years.3 However, the Commission's
desire for a re-evaluation of the legislation stemmed largely from the
perception that the aims of the Directive, whether these were to
ensure the effective flow of personal information in the European
Single Market, or to ensure the right of European citizens to control
the uses to which their personal data were put, were not being
adequately met by national legislative implementations and
administrative practice.
* Andrew Charlesworth, Senior Research Fellow in IT & Law and Director of the
Centre for IT & Law, Departments of Law and Computer Science, University of Bristol,
UK., a.j.charlesworth@bristol.ac.uk. The Centre for IT & Law is sponsored by Vodafone
Group Services Ltd, Barclaycard, Herbert Smith, Hewlett Packard Laboratories and the
Law Society Charitable Trust.
1. See Press Release, European Commission, Data Protection: Commission Seeks
Views on Privacy Legislation (June 25, 2002) (IP/02/923).
2. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 [hereinafter DPD].
3. Although the implementation date for the Directive was October 1998, by October
1999 only six of the fifteen Member States had achieved full implementation. The UK, for
example, did not achieve full compliance with the Directive until March 2000. Indeed, at
the start of the Commission's review process in 2002, three Member States, France,
Luxembourg and Ireland still did not appear to have fully implemented the Directive's
provisions into their national laws.
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A further matter to be considered was that the Directive was
drafted, debated, and implemented at a time of rapid technological
chan e. The Commission originally introduced the draft legislation in
1990, but this version proved highly unpopular with the Member
States and the commercial sector. After protracted discussions with
the Member States and the European Parliament, the Commission
produced a considerably restructured proposal in October 1992.'
Despite the radical overhaul, a Common Position was not reached in
the Council of Ministers until February 1995, and the Directive was
only finally adopted in October 1995, five years after its initial
introduction.6 When one plots this gestationary timeline against, for
example, a timeline of Internet developments,' it is clear that the
technological environment at the end of that period was very
different from that at the start. In 1990, the Internet was largely
uncommercialized, and key tools such as Wide Area Information
Servers ("WAIS"), Gopher, PGP, and the World Wide Web were still
a year away; by 1995 Internet users were already acquainted with
Netscape, RealAudio and JAVA, as well as the terms "spam" and
"banner ads," and by the time the Directive was supposed to be
implemented by the Member States in 1998, the terms "e-commerce,"
"e-auctions," and "portals" were common parlance.
The Internet was not the only technological arena undergoing
explosive change during this period; the commercial sector too was
coming to terms with a range of new technologies which, in
combination with the transnational opportunities provided by the
increasing popularity of free trade, were transforming business
practices. Many of those practices involved the transfer of personal
information about EU citizens, not just within the EU, but
considerably further afield, to countries where the cost of "back
office" or "remote processing" could be significantly reduced.8
4. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in
Relation to the Processing of Personal Data, COM (90) 314 (July 27, 1990).
5. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Movement of Such Data, COM (92) 422 (Nov.
27, 1992).
6. See Nick Platten, Background to and History of the Directive, in DAVID IAN
BAINBRIDGE, THE EC DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE at 13-32 (1996); Graham Pearce
& Nick Platten, Achieving Personal Data Protection in the European Union, 36 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 529 (1998).
7. See Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline v6.0 at http://www.zakon.org/
robert/internet/timeline (Feb. 5, 2003).
8. Robert Marquand, Fast, Cheap, and in English, India Clerks for the World,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 30, 1999, at 7 (noting that India has become an extremely
popular location for such processing with estimates suggesting that the back-office sector
in India grew from $15 million to $300 million between 1996 and 1999 alone).
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The Commission's review process was thus driven, in part, by the
perception that the Directive had not aged well given the rapid
developments in the related fields of information technology and
modern business practice, and also by the recognition that, far from
creating a harmonized area of law, the broad statements of intent in
the Directive had resulted in the Member States creating a diverse
patchwork of legal and administrative rules, which not only hampered
transborder data flows between EU Member States and non-Member
States, but also militated against the key aim of the Directive by
creating barriers to the efficient flow of personal data between the
Member States themselves.
Thus, while some positive benefits had arisen from the
implementation of the DPD, notably the acceptance across the EU of
the need for a minimum level of legislative protection for personal
data privacy, premised on the Council of Europe Convention 108/81
for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing
of personal data,9 and the Fair Information Practice Principles in the
OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data," there remained a lack of
coherency and consistency to the Member States' approach which
prevented the attainment of true harmonization-the "one law from
many."
The Commission itself can be criticized for failing to provide
sufficient oversight and guidance in the implementation process, and
its key policy review body, the Article 29 Working Party," has been
criticized as both lacking transparency in its deliberations, and
flexibility in its opinions. 2 In the view of a significant number of data
controllers, this has resulted in varying degrees of over-regulation by
the Member States. When combined with a lack of willingness by
some national data protection regulators to endorse the use of
alternative measures to aid efficient and effective compliance with the
law, for example, the lack of consensus over the use of contractual
9. Council of Europe Convention 108/81, Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 20 I.L.M. 317 (E.T.S.
108), 20 I.L.M. 422 (E.T.S. 181).
10. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Council
Recommendation Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Oct. 1, 1980 (final), C(80) 58, 20 I.L.M. 422.
11. The Article 29 Working Party is an advisory group, set up by the DPD, composed
of representatives of the data protection authorities of the Member States. It acts
independently and examines any questions concerning the application of the national
measures adopted under the DPD to foster the uniform application of such measures. See
http://europa.eu.int.
12. See International Chamber of Commerce, Comments on the Review of the EU
General Data Protection Directive, 2-3 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market
privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/icc en.pdf (May 28, 2002).
terms by data controllers to overcome the problems posed by national
adequacy rulings (or, more accurately, the lack of them) in the area of
transborder data flows, this has made it almost impossible for data
controllers to comply with the requirements of the Directive.
The Commission's initiative, which took the form of a somewhat
unscientific consultation by means of a set of online questionnaires
for data controllers and data subjects, 3 a call for position papers from
interested parties,4 and a two-day conference held in Brussels on
September 30-October 1, 2002, looks likely to result in the
Commission making few, if any, changes to the substantive
legislation, seeking instead to adjust the EU data protection regime
through administrative change at the Member State level. Such
changes would involve simplifying the notification process for data
controllers; ensuring better dialogue between the Community data
privacy institutions (notably the Article 29 Working Party), national
data protection authorities, and data controllers; requiring a greater
degree of cooperation between the national data protection
authorities; increased promotion of the use of self-regulatory
mechanisms and Codes of Conduct; making provision for more
flexible arrangements for transborder data flows, in particular for
flows to non-EU states; and encouraging the use of privacy enhancing
technologies ("PETs"). 6 The Commission's aim is thus to attempt to
attain the as yet distant goal of functional data privacy harmonization
without having to further water down the individual data privacy
protection provided by the Directive, or by trying to adopt further,
more prescriptive, legislation to force the Member States into
conformity, an approach which would likely face stern resistance from
both Member States and the commercial sector.'7
13. Questionnaire for on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive
(95/46/EC): Results of the on-line consultation at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal -market/privacy/docs/lawreport/consultation/consultation-citizens-en.pdf (June
20-Sept. 15, 2002).
14. Consultation on the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/internalmarket/privacy/lawreport/paper-en.htm.
15. Data Protection Conference and Report on the implementation of Directive
95/46/EC: Programme and Speeches at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/
privacy/lawreport/programme-en.htm.
16. Speech by Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, Closing Remarks at European
Commission Conference on "Data Protection," Oct. 1, 2002 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/en/speeches/spch-02-439_en.htm.
17. Id. (stating that given the difficulties in reaching an agreement acceptable across
the Member States with regard to the 1995 Data Protection Directive, the likelihood of
the Commission attempting a more restrictive form of Directive, or even a Regulation,
remains very much an option of last resort).
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While some of the proposed administrative changes would
appear to be relatively uncontroversial-for example, the use of a
more open and transparent Article 29 Working Party to identify
divergences in Member States policy and to suggest methods by
which these could be reduced; and the simplification of the
notification process, a system that is universally unpopular, not even
viewed with any enthusiasm by the UK, the Member State from
whose data privacy legislation it was derived-several of the other
proposals are likely to be rather less popular with some national
authorities and the general public. While they may be presented in
terms of increasing harmonization and optimizing enforcement, they
may also be viewed as either weakening the protection provided by
the Directive, or potentially misleading data subjects about the extent
to which their personal data is in fact protected.
I. New Proposals for Optimizing Enforcement
Much of the information in this section is drawn from discussion
at the Commission's Data Protection Conference in Brussels and also
from the written responses of interested parties to the European
Commission's request for position papers on the implementation of
Directive 95/46/EC.18 It should be noted that the written responses
received by the Commission were overwhelmingly dominated by
those submitted by commercial interest groups and law firms;
responses and representations from individuals, or from consumer or
citizen representative groups, were few and far between. A number
of the organizations that responded to the European Commission's
request for position papers were concerned primarily, or exclusively,
with their own sphere of operations. 9 However, a clear set of generic
issues of concern can be derived from wider study of the position
papers.
18. Consultation on the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 14.
19. See European Market Research Alliance, Position Paper regarding the Review of
the EU General Data Protection Directive (Aug. 23, 2002) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/emra-en.pdf; Comitd Europden des
Assurances, Comments by Comit6 Europ6en des Assurances concerning the Application
of Directive 95/46/EC on Personal Data Protection at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/cea-en.pdf (Nov. 12, 2002); British Music
Rights, Implementation of Data Protection Directive (95/45/EC) at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paperlbritishmusic-en.pdf (Oct. 14, 2002).
The most unusual submission is probably that from British Music Rights whose only
apparent interest in the Directive is to ensure that it should not obstruct the ability of
intellectual property rights' owners to obtain from Internet service providers the names
and addresses of individuals disseminating illegal copies of copyrighted materials online.
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The four areas that will be considered here are:
ethe need to establish a coherent legal regime relevant to data
protection;
'the need for changes to administrative practices in the area of
business related transborder data flows between the Member
States, and between Member States and third party States;
*the wider use of PETs; and
*the promotion of self-regulation and Codes of Practice.
The use of the latter two methods, in particular, is often discussed in
the context of attempting to find alternatives to formal legal
regulation, but here they are considered as supplementary to it. This
combined legislative and administrative approach may, to an extent,
ameliorate the more obvious criticisms made of these administrative
methods when they are proffered as a solution for achieving personal
data privacy in their own right."
A. A Coherent Legal Regime for Data Protection
Commentators from outside the EU sometimes appear to view
the EU's data privacy regime as a tightly drawn supra-national
framework in which all Member States are in close agreement."
While such a minimalist portrayal may be of value when arguing the
pros and cons of the approach taken by the Directive and the
approach taken by other non-EU states, a more nuanced analysis
soon shows that the EU data privacy regime is far from a coherent
whole. Indeed, the perception amongst commercial organizations
operating within the EU seems to be that, while they may object in
principle to various elements of the Directive, it is often the
inconsistencies between Member State implementations that cause
them the greater financial and administrative problems. These
inconsistencies stem primarily from three main sources: first, that not
all the Member States have implemented the Directive; second, that
the harmonization proposed in the Directive has not in fact occurred;
and third, that there are now several pieces of potentially conflicting
EU legislation dealing with issues related to data privacy.
20. See also Andrew Charlesworth, Data Privacy in Cyberspace: Not National vs.
International but Commercial vs. Individual in LAW AND THE INTERNET: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 79 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde
eds., 2000); Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847 (1998); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 771 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace
Filters, Privacy Control and Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. REV 743.
21. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997); PETER P. SWIRE
& ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS (1998).
[Vol. 54
April 2003] EUROPEAN UNION INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 937
(1) Failure to Implement
In order for there to be effective harmonization of the legal
regime for data protection in the EU, it is essential for all Member
States to have implemented the Directive. Achieving this goal,
however, has proven to be no easy task, due to significant resistance
on the part of some Member States. When the date for
implementation passed, in October 1998, the Commission would have
stepped up its formal pressure on those Member States who failed to
meet the deadline by requesting reasons for the failure. By July 1999,
it had begun the second stage of formal infringement proceedings
under Article 226 EC 2  by sending "reasoned opinions" to nine
Member States23 noting their failure to notify all the measures
necessary to implement the Directive. Finally, in January 2000 the
Commission brought legal actions before the European Court of
Justice against five Member States-France, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Germany, and Ireland-on the grounds of continuing
failure to meet their Community obligations. Since then, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg have notified implementing
measures. However, to date, only Luxembourg appears to have
received a formal ruling against it by the European Court of Justice
for non-implementation" and the current status of the cases brought
against France and Ireland is unclear. Neither has implemented the
22. Article 226 EC provides the procedure by which the European Commission can
enforce the observance of EC law by the Member States. This takes place in several
stages:
there are informal negotiations between the two parties;
if no satisfactory conclusion is reached, the Commission will send a letter of
formal notice pointing out the specific infringements of Community law, for
example non-implementation of a Directive within the set time period, and
asking Member State to explain the reason for the infringement;
if the Member State neither provides an acceptable reason, nor remedies the
infringements, the Commission issues a 'reasoned opinion' which sets out the
legal grounds and submissions that the Commission will be seeking to rely upon
should proceedings be started before the European Court of Justice, the
measures the Commission feels should be taken to end the breach, and a time
limit for the Member State to comply;
if the infringement continues, the Commission may bring a procedure for
enforcement before the European Court of Justice requesting a ruling that the
Member State has not fulfilled its obligations under EC law.
Continued infringement by a Member State after the ECJ has found a failure to meet
its Community obligations may result in financial penalties being imposed under
Article 228 EC.
23. France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Denmark, Spain, and Austria.
24. Case 450/00, Commission v. Luxembourg, 1 E.C.R. 7069 (2001) available at
http://www.etat.lu/memorial/memorial/a/2002/aO911308.pdf (Luxembourg adopted a new
data protection law in August 2002, which entered into force in December 2002).
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Directive, although both have now placed draft implementing
legislation before their national legislatures,9 which action may have
persuaded the Commission not to pursue the legal avenue. However,
as both nations have pre-existing national data privacy laws,26 this
presents potential problems for companies operating within those
countries in terms of deciding which law they are required to comply
with, the existing national law, or the EU Directive. This has brought
calls for a more vigilant approach to implementation by the
Commission, as well as for the Commission to have further recourse
to the European Court of Justice.
(2) Lack of Harmonization
It is obvious from the discussions at the Commission's Data
Protection Conference in Brussels, and in the representations made
by many of the organizations that responded to the European
Commission's request for position papers, that a pressing concern was
the fact that where Member States had implemented the Directive
they had signally failed to liaise with regard to issues such as
terminology and procedural requirements, so as to achieve practical,
as opposed to theoretical, harmonization of national laws, and that
this was causing difficulties for organizations wishing to transfer
personal data within the EU, and from the EU to third party nations.
It is, of course, unlikely that the Commission would have
expected the Directive to have achieved full harmonization of
Member State laws in the short to medium term, or indeed that full
harmonization would necessarily have been the Commission's goal.
The nature of EU directives, as opposed to EU regulations, 27 is to set
out a legislative goal for the Member States, to be reached by a
certain date, but to allow them significant discretion as to how exactly
that goal will be obtained within their national legal systems.2' This
element of discretion afforded to the Member States often allows for
agreement to be reached in the Council of Ministers, where
25. European Commission, Status of implementation of Directive 95/46 on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/internalmarket/privacy/law/implementationen.htm.
26. Data Protection Act No. 25, 1988, available at http://www.dataprivacy.ie/6ai.htm
(data protection provision in Ireland); Loi N' 78-17 du 6 Janvier 1978 relative
l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertds, available at http://www.cnil.fr/textes/docs/loi78-
17.pdf (data protection provision in France).
27. EU regulations become part of a Member State's national law in their entirety and
without any need for Member State implementation-they are thus deemed to be
"directly applicable." Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC TREATY], art. 249(2).
28. Id. at art. 249(3).
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agreement on more prescriptive legislation in the form of a
regulation, might be harder, if not impossible, to obtain.
Thus, while the use of regulations in the area of harmonization is
not unknown, in practice most harmonizing legislation takes the form
of directives. In this case, as the attitude of the various Member
States to the concept of personal data privacy during the negotiations
leading to the adoption of the Directive varied from indifference,
through pragmatic acceptance, to its elevation to a quasi-human right,
the choice by the Commission of a harmonizing Directive rather than
a Regulation is hardly surprising. On the principle that past
experience has shown that Member States have become increasingly
adroit at implementing interpretations of directives that suit their
national predilections and biases, the Commission would almost
certainly have expected that there would be considerable initial
differences between the Member States' implementing laws, and that
to achieve effective harmonization might take time and require either
further intervention by the Commission, informally via negotiation,
or formally by way of the Article 226/228 EC compliance mechanism,
or by the European Court of Justice in the form of Article 234 EC
preliminary rulings29 on the interpretation of the Directive.
This approach to harmonization of Member States' laws, while
serving the Commission well enough in other areas of EU activity,
seems to be untenable in the area of data privacy, largely because, as
discussed earlier, it is unable, within an acceptable timeframe, to
achieve the degree of harmonization now required by the pace of
developments in information technology and modern business
practice. The extent to which the existing legal framework for data
protection lacks basic consistency is demonstrated neatly by the fact
that of the fifteen Member States, four protect the personal data of
"natural" and "legal" persons in their data protection laws," while the
remaining eleven protect only the personal data of "natural" persons.
29. Id. at art. 234.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community...
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is
necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a
ruling thereon.
Id.
30. Austria, Denmark, Italy, and Luxembourg.
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In comparison to most national legislation, which tends to be
drafted in precise detail, EU directives are often drafted in fairly
sweeping terms, in part to avoid interfering unduly with the Member
States' right to choose the form and method of implementation. This
provides considerable scope for interpretative license on the part of
the Member States, even in relatively uncontroversial areas. A
common complaint about the DPD is that a number of its key terms
were either not defined, or not adequately defined, and that neither
the Commission nor the Article 29 Working Party provided adequate
terminological guidance to the Member States during the
implementation period. This resulted in differing legislative rules and
administrative practices being adopted by the Member States. When
one considers that examples of differing definitions between the
Member States include those for such key terms as "data controller,"
"data processor," "sensitive data," "anonymous data," "consent,"
"third party," "establishment," and "equipment," one may get some
sense of the difficulties involved for a commercial organization in
achieving cross-border data privacy compliance.
Where definitions were provided in the DPD, they were often so
wide-ranging as to be rendered meaningless when passed through the
implementation process. For example, while the definition of
"sensitive data" (personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex
life3") in the Directive is quite broad to begin with, some Member
States appear to have defined "sensitive data" considerably more
widely than others. For example, Portugal includes data about the
"private life" of the individual within the definition, thereby requiring
express consent for collection of data on consumer and household
habits," whereas in the UK such data would almost certainly be
treated as "non-sensitive" personal data and would require a
correspondingly lower degree of protection.
Additionally, it can be seen that, if applied strictly, the categories
of "sensitive data" require the same test to be applied both to data
which are of extreme sensitivity, and to data which fall within the
broad definition, but which may be considered relatively trivial in
nature. This can be seen in the context of "data concerning health,"
which could cover anything from the processing of data relating to an
individual's AIDS/HIV+ status, which is undeniably highly sensitive
31. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 8(1).
32. EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, Position
Paper on the review of Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with regard to
the Processing of Personal Data at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/
docs/lawreport/paper/amcham-en.pdf (Aug. 7, 2002).
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personal data, to the processing of data relating to an individual's
absences from University tutorials due to illness, which seems to be
an altogether less potentially damaging activity. As the British
Bankers Association puts it:
Minor injuries are bracketed with highly sensitive personal
information and require the same degree of specific consent. All
processing [sic] should undertake risk assessment, and ensure that
suitable measures are taken to ensure fair and lawful processing
takes place and also that appropriate security measures are
applied.33
Certainly, with hindsight, the decision to create two categories of
personal data in the Directive seems an unnecessary complication, as
data controllers are in any event required to process fairly and
lawfully, regardless of the type of data. Indeed, the UK Information
Commissioner, in her response to the UK Home Office's Public
Consultation exercise on the implementation of the Directive in 2000,
commented that:
The concept of "sensitive data" is misguided. Sensitivity depends
on context. It is best addressed by appropriate interpretation of the
data protection principles. The conditions for processing sensitive
data do not achieve their aim.
34
However, whatever the merits of such a change, unless the existing
Directive is to be heavily amended, or even replaced, it seems
unlikely that the distinction between "sensitive" and "non-sensitive"
data can be easily removed.
Concerns have also been raised that, by creating such broad
definitions as that for "personal data,"-"any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person"35-the Directive was
causing significant unnecessary difficulties with established and
uncontroversial business practices. An example of this was raised by
a number of parties, including the International Chamber of
Commerce36 and the European Privacy Officers' Forum ("EPOF"),
37
which noted that the existing definition of "personal data" in the
Directive and in Member State laws made no distinction between an
individual's personal data in their employment capacity, as opposed
to their personal capacity, and suggested that to treat "professional
33. British Bankers' Association, Data Protection in the Community: EU enquiry on
the implementation of privacy legislation, Comment 12 at http://europa.eu.int/comml
internalmarket/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/bba-en.pdf (Sept. 20, 2002).
34. Lord Chancellor's Department, Data Protection Act 1998: Post-Implementation
Appraisal, art. 8 at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/ccpd/dparesp.htm#partl3 (Dec. 2001).
35. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 2(a).
36. International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 12, at 2.
37. The European Privacy Officers' Forum, Comments on Review of the EU Data
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-
market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/epofen.pdf (July 31, 2002).
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data," which caused no obvious threat to the individual's right of
privacy, in this manner was an unnecessarily strict approach." This
interpretation would seem to accord with the attitude of the UK
Information Commissioner's Office, which has taken the broad line
that, in the absence of a pressing privacy rationale,39 "professional
data" such as information specific to the employment, business, or
professional responsibilities of a data-subject including name, job
title, workplace contact details, and description of activities and
transaction would not normally require application of the full panoply
of data protections.4"
A final example of the difficulties caused by the definitional
vagaries of the Directive can be seen with the concept of "consent."
The construction of the Directive means that there is a significant role
for data subject consent with respect to the fair and lawful processing
of their data, both "non-sensitive" and "sensitive." While there are
other grounds under which fair and lawful processing may take place,
for example, the "balance of interests" ground, which allows
processing which is necessary for the legitimate interests of the data
controller where the processing does not cause undue pre)udice to the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject,' consent is
often the ground on which data controllers would prefer to justify
their processing.42 However, the Directive is vague as to how consent
might be conveyed, beyond providing that the standard should be
higher in the case of "sensitive" data.
38. id. at 3-4.
39. For example, employment details about individuals who work in the area of animal
experimentation, and who might be identified and targeted for physical attack by animal
rights campaigners on the basis of that information, or an employee who has been the
subject of spousal abuse and who wishes for their whereabouts to remain undisclosed.
40. This issue has been raised, in particular, in the context of websites (which are
generally, by their very nature, accessible to the world, which raises the matter of data
transfer outside the EU/EEA to countries without adequate protections for data privacy)
and the extent to which employers are entitled to place details of their employees on
websites without first obtaining their consent.
41. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 7(f). This basis for processing is not itself
uncontroversial, as the Member States have adopted different approaches to its
interpretation-providing a harmonized approach on the issue of what is "unduly
prejudicial to the fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects" requires agreement
on what those fundamental rights and freedoms are, as well as on the scope for, and
degree of, prejudice in any given context. Here again, commercial enterprises are likely to
be prevented from constructing a Europe-wide "balance of interests" test for their data
processing operations. See EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Belgium, supra note 32, at 6.
42. Allen & Overy, Data Protection Directive (95/45/EC) Questionnaire: Position
Paper for Discussion at the Data Protection Conference from Allen & Overy on Behalf of
its Clients, 2 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/
allen-overy-en.pdf (Aug. 30, 2002).
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[Consent] shall mean any freely given specific and informed
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed. 3
[Non-sensitive] personal data may be processed only if... the data
subject has unambiguously given his consent.
44
[Sensitive personal data may be processed only] if the data subject
has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data.45
Quite what the practical difference is between "unambiguous" and
"explicit" consent remains unclear-the Directive does not specify
that consent should be obtained in any specific form. Certainly, the
Member States do not appear to have reached a common consensus
on the matter. For example, it appears that Italy requires that
consent must be "freely expressed," "specific," and "documented in
writing,, 46 which may cause difficulties with consent which has
purportedly been given online. In Germany the standard for consent
appears to be based on the "opt-in" model, where the data subject
must make some positive indication of consent, such as ticking a
check box, while in the UK, it appears that implied consent, such as
where the data subject has failed to tick an opt-out box, or where a
customer, having been notified of new data processing purposes,
continues to use the facilities provided by a company, will suffice, at
least for the processing of non-sensitive data.47
Leaving aside definitional issues in the legislative
implementation, the legal requirements and administrative
procedures adopted by the Member States and their national data
protection authorities also vary greatly. An example of this would be
the various implementations of the Directive's requirement for a data
controller to delete customer data. Citigroup noted that:
[i]n Spain, the requirement is to delete all data from records held
by the data controller as soon as the relationship ends, which makes
it difficult to resolve questions or disputes of former customers. In
the UK, data can be kept for a reasonable period of time after the
relationship ends. In Greece, the retention period for data can be
extended only with the approval of the local Data Protection
Authority.'
It also appears that the data retention requirements in Member
States' data protection laws do not always mesh with the
43. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 2(h).
44. Id. at art. 7(a).
45. Id. at art. 8(2)(a).
46. Confindustria, Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC in Italy, 1 at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/internalmarket/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/confindustria-en.pdf.
47. EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, supra note
32, at 6.
48. Citigroup, Review of the EU Data Protection Directive, 3 at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internalmarket/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/citigroup-en.pdf (Aug. 22, 2002).
requirements of their own financial services laws and regulations, let
alone those of other Member States. With regard to data security
measures, here too the legal requirements are far from uniform, with
the Spanish law on database security being held up as an example of
security taken to extremes, as it requires that each database has a
security protocol describing the full technical system, the security
measures, and the circumstances that affect the database, and a
mandatory audit every two years." In contrast, the UK provisions
leave the data controller to determine the level of security
appropriate to the data held, and there is no requirement to state the
level of that security or a requirement of audit.
The notification requirement, whereby data controllers must
notify the national authorities of the countries in which they process
data of the nature and scope of their processing operations, arouses
particular angst among commercial data controllers, with many of the
respondents to the Commission's call for position papers indicating
their dislike of the process. Most would find the process unnecessary
and burdensome, even if it were a standardized process across the
EU, '0 but as one respondent commented:
Countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, and the
UK have adopted a minimalist approach with broad exemptions
and short, relatively simple notification forms. Other countries,
such as France and Spain, have adopted few or no exemptions, and
use lengthy, complicated forms. Moreover, DPA notification forms
generally are inflexible, and do not permit an adequate description
of the data processing operation."
Many respondents thus suggested the abolition of the entire
notification process, although the majority recognize that unless there
is a major alteration to the Directive, such a radical change is
probably not an option. As an alternative, a number of respondents
suggested that companies processing data in more than one Member
State might be permitted to notify in a central EU data protection
office, or be able to notify in a single Member State and have that
49. EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, supra note
32, at 10.
50. The UK Information Commissioner Elizabeth France herself has queried the
usefulness of notification in her response to the Home Office's Public Consultation
exercise in 2000, noting that "[t]he notification provisions impose burdens which are
disproportionate to any benefits. If retained, they should be limited to the provision of
details about controllers and the nature of their business." Lord Chancellor's
Department, supra note 34, at Part B.
51. Covington & Burling, Comments on Implementation and Application of the 1995
Data Protection Directive, 5 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/
lawreport/paper/covington-burlingen.pdf.
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notification recognized as valid in the other Member States on the
principle of "mutual recognition.,
5
1
It will be apparent from the foregoing that the harmonization
problem will be difficult to overcome as, left to their own devices, the
Member States appear unlikely to manage a rapid convergence of
their data protection laws. The Commission is thus essentially faced
with a short list of choices:
" It could decide to exchange the Directive for a Regulation. The
key benefit of this would be the ability to set a uniform set of
definitions and standards across the Member States by removing
the Member States' discretion to choose the manner and form of
an implementing measure. The main objection to such a move is
that it would be difficult and ultimately extremely time-consuming
to attempt to reach agreement on a set of definitions and
standards that would then be imposed on the Member States.
Even though it is arguable that the Member States are now much
closer in their understanding of the nature and scope of data
privacy law than they were in the early 1990s, there are still
significant differences that would be difficult to overcome.
Additionally, given the on-going implementation of the Directive,
and the associated work taking place in relation to cross-border
data transfers both within and outside the EEA, to undertake
such a radical change in EU policy would probably be counter-
productive.
" It could undertake a major revision of the existing Directive.
Given that the Directive has clearly failed on a number of levels
to achieve even a minimum harmonization of Member State laws,
a major revision might seem appropriate. That having been said,
such a major revision would face similar time problems as the first
option, and there would be further scope for Member State delays
in implementation. It also appears that the Commission is
unconvinced that the difficulties faced by commercial
organizations are caused, or exacerbated, by the Directive itself
rather than by national implementation, or national enforcement
practices. If that is the case, a revision of the Directive is unlikely
to lead to a significantly improved degree of harmonization than
can be achieved, in time, by the existing legislation.
" It could pass additional specific directives in various areas of
activity. This approach was being mooted even before the
Commission began its review, and both the Directorate-General
for Employment and Social Affairs of the European
52. Id. at 4-5; see also Confederation of British Industry, Comments on Directive
95/46 EC re data protection, 11-12 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/
docs/lawreport/paper/cbi-en.pdf (Aug. 10, 2002).
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Commission53 and the Article 29 Working Party54 have produced
documents relating to employee data privacy, which suggests that
this might be an area where a specific directive could be
considered. However, further specific legislation is likely to meet
with stiff resistance from both Member States and from
commercial organizations which are still, in many cases, coming to
terms with the original directive. Indeed, as noted below, many
commercial organizations believe there are already too many
pieces of legislation that incorporate data protection elements.
New specific legislation would, in any case, be unlikely to have a
significant harmonizing effect, and, if passed in relatively
controversial areas, such as employment, might in fact have quite
the opposite effect.
* It could continue to use existing mechanisms for cooperation at
the EU level to work towards common application of the
Directive. While there are some problems, such as the "non-
sensitive"/"sensitive" data divide and the notification procedure,
where the most obvious method of resolution is a revision of the
Directive, it may well be more effective for the Commission to use
existing mechanisms such as Notices and Recommendations to
clarify the interpretation of provisions, and where Member States
prove recalcitrant in their legislative or administrative
implementation, to resort to Article 226/228 proceedings for
incorrect and/or non-implementation.
A number of respondents called for a closer cooperation
between industry, the Commission, the Article 29 Working Party and
the Article 31 Committee55 in the development of European
approaches to key issues. While this might indeed be a positive step
towards a more effective and efficient EU-wide implementation of
the Directive, one would note that the interests of industry, while
legitimate, are not the only interests that are at stake. EU citizens
must also have a voice in this ongoing process, and the risk is, as was
obvious both at the Commission's Data Protection Conference, and
53. European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Article 29 Working
Party Opinion on the Processing of Personal Data in the Employment Context at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf (Sept.
31, 2001); European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Second stage
consultation of social partners on the protection of workers' personal data at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/news/2002/oct/data-prot-en.pdf (Oct. 30,
2002).
54. European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Article 29 Working
Party Opinion on the Processing of Personal Data in the Employment Context at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketprivacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf (Sept.
13, 2001).
55. The Article 31 Committee consists of government experts (usually from Ministries
of Justice) which consider the legislative aspects involved in implementing the DPD.
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in the representation of the position papers, that the citizens' voices
may be signally underrepresented in the harmonization process.
(3) Uncoordinated Legislative Approach
A common complaint regarding data privacy law in the EU is
that there has been a failure by the European Union institutions to
co-ordinate those pieces of EU legislation which have data privacy
elements, and that this has resulted in a lack of clarity in Community
objectives, caused further inconsistencies in Member State
implementation, and made it extremely difficult for commercial
organizations to create consistent EU wide policies. With regard to
the issue of conflicting legislation, one respondent to the Commission
wrote:
[T]he Distance Selling Directive,56  the new Electronic
Communications Data Protection Directive,' 7 the E-Commerce
Directive"' and the Electronic Signatures Directive 9 all include
provisions relevant to data protection. Some of these adopt
different approaches on the same issue (e.g. opt in vs. opt out in
relation to unsolicited emails) or impose more onerous provisions
in relation to certain sectors of the market (e.g. the more stringent
data protection obligations under the Electronic Signatures
Directive which are imposed on certification service providers in
relation to their use of personal data). This has caused confusion
about which Directives are to be followed when, and exactly what
requirements companies have to follow.60
This seems a justifiable complaint, although in defense of the
Commission, the technical advances since the early 1990s were
inevitably going to create new issues that were not necessarily clearly
covered by the Data Protection Directive, such as the seemingly
uncontrollable increase in the amount of "unsolicited commercial e-
mail" ("UCE") or "spam," and the use of "spyware" and other web
surveillance techniques to collect data on web users. Some Member
States have attempted to avoid producing confusing implementing
56. Council Directive 97/7/EC, May 20, 1997, On the Protection of Consumers in
Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19-27.
57. Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and
the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37-
47.
58. Council Directive 2000/31/EC, June 8, 2000, On Certain Legal Aspects of
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market,
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1-16.
59. Council Directive 1999/93/EC, Dec. 13, 1999, On a Community Framework for
Electronic Signatures, 2000 O.J. (L 013) 12-20.
60. Tite & Lewis, Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC: Response to the European
Commission's Three Yearly Review, 3 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en/
dataprot/lawreportlpapers/tite-lewis.pdf (Aug. 30, 2002) (all footnotes in this quotation are
attributable to the author).
legislation-the UK government has decided not to pass additional
measures relating to UCE, despite the EU's adoption of the E-
Commerce Directive which contains specific measures in relation to
UCE, on the grounds that the UK Data Protection Act 1998 already
provides the necessary elements.6" It would seem, however, that the
Commission will have to give careful consideration to the future
development of legislation in this area.
B. Administrative Practices and Transborder Data Flows
(1) EU/EEA Data Flows
The problem with the lack of practical harmonization of Member
State laws becomes most apparent where organizations are involved
in the transfer of personal data between Member States, or into and
out of the EU/EEA, as it is difficult for companies to establish a set of
operating rules for data protection within their organization that are
acceptable to the national regulatory authorities of all the Member
States. This is seen, not unnaturally, as a considerable and largely
unnecessary impediment to business efficiency.
Before the Directive was adopted, most Member States' data
protection laws effectively applied only to the processing of personal
data within the state's borders. Thus, the nationality or legal domicile
of data subjects was not the determining factor in deciding if national
law was to be applied; but rather whether there was a link between
the relevant data controller or data processing operation and the
territory of the state. If the data controller and the data processing
operation had close links to the territory of a state, in that the data
controller resided or was established in the territory and/or the
processing was carried out in the territory, then the state's country's
data protection law normally applied to the controller and the
processing operation. Only in rare cases did Member States attempt
to apply data protection legislation to data processing taking place
outside their territories, primarily due to the obvious difficulties
inherent in the conflict of laws arena.
Article 4 of the Directive addresses the choice of law issue,
stating that each Member State must apply its national legislation to
61. Although whether this is in fact the case remains a matter of some debate, the UK
government having adopted this position following heavy lobbying by UK Internet Service
Providers and their representative organizations. It is likely that ISPs felt that the
requirements of the E-commerce Directive would place pressure on them to take
measures against UCE, and those sending UCE, whereas the Data Protection Act 1998
places the impetus upon the data subject/end-user to take action against misuse of their
data, however, placing the burden on the end-user would not seem to reflect the language
of the E-Commerce Directive.
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the processing of personal data carried out by data controllers
established in that Member State. Where a data controller is
established in several Member States, each of those establishments
must comply with the obligations laid down by the relevant national
law.62 Where the data controller is not established in a Member State,
but under international public law the Member State's national law
would apply, it must apply its national legislation to the processing of
personal data.63 Where the controller is not established in any
Member State, but makes use of equipment situated on the territory
of a Member State, that state's national legislation must be applied to
the processing operation, unless the controller only uses the
equipment for the transit of the data through a Member State, 6 and
the data controller must designate a representative established in the
Member State.65 The purpose of these rules was to ensure that data
subjects were not exposed accidentally or deliberately to situations
where they would have no recourse to any legal system to protect the
rights granted by the Directive, and to avoid the same processing
operation being governed by the law of more than one country.66
This might, perhaps, have been effective if the Member States
had transposed the Directive in a consistent fashion, but as with so
many other areas of the Directive, there are significant differences
between the Member States' interpretation of the nature and scope of
Article 4. As was noted in the consultation process,
Finland's data protection law applies to the processing of personal
data where the controller's place of activity is located within
Finnish territory or in general comes under Finnish jurisdiction. By
contrast, Sweden's data protection law applies to data controllers
established in Sweden. This raises the question of which country's
law should apply to the processing of personal data carried out in
Sweden by a company established only in Finland.67
The issue of what "establishment" means has also arisen-it is key to
the application of Article 4, but essentially undefined in the Directive,
except that recital 19 states that the criterion of establishment
"implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable
arrangements."6  This does not provide a great deal of guidance,
particularly since the recital then goes on to state that "the legal form
62. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 4(1)(a).
63. Id. at art. 4(1)(b).
64. Id. at art. 4(1)(c).
65. Id. at art. 4(2).
66. See Commentary from the European Commission in relation to the 1992 Amended
Proposal for the Directive, COM(92) 422 final (Oct. 15, 1992).
67. EICTA, Comments on the General Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (the
"Directive"), 4 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/lawreport/
paper/ecta-en.pdf (July 30, 2002).
68. DPD, supra note 2, T 19.
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of such an establishment, whether simply a branch or a subsidiary
with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect."
Particular problems arise when considering processing of data via the
Internet, where the circumstances may be such that it is difficult
enough for a data subject or data protection authority to determine
the physical location of the data controller, never mind to work out
where it is "established." 9  A more uniform interpretation of
"establishment" will inevitably be required if Article 4 is to be
meaningful.
Yet a further bone of contention is the question of the scope of
the phrase "makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise,"
notably whether this formulation would stretch to cover Internet-only
contacts from outside the EU, for example, when a British consumer
visits the website of a New York-based company. The Article 29
Working Party courted controversy in a recent Working Paper0 by
suggesting that while "not any interaction between an Internet user in
the EU and a web site based outside the EU leads necessarily to the
application of EU data protection law... it is not necessary that the
controller exercise full control over the equipment,"7 in short,
suggesting that, for example, where cookies are placed on the hard
disk of a user's computer, or JavaScript or a banner ad is used, "the
user's PC can be viewed as equipment in the sense of Article 4(1)(c)
of Directive 95/46/EC." 7 This means that the that the national law of
the Member State where the user's PC is located would apply to the
conditions under which his personal data may be collected by placing
cookies on his hard disk, or by running JavaScript routines. While,
the French text of the Directive, which can be read more liberally
than the English, might support this interpretation, it has met with
stiff resistance from the business community which has responded
with suggestions that such a broad interpretation of the phrase would
be unworkable in its application to the Web, and might compromise
existing measures such as the U.S. Safe Harbor agreement, because
the direct application of EU data protection law to a U.S. company,
by virtue of its processing of personal data from EU citizens gathered
through its websites, would remove any incentive to join the Safe
Harbor.73
69. Global Privacy Alliance, Untitled Position Paper, 12 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/gpaen.pdf (Aug. 5, 2002).
70. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on determining the
international application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the
Internet by non-EU based web sites, 5035/01/EN/Final (WP 56) at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internalmarket/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp56_en.pdf (May 30, 2002).
71. Id. at 9.
72. ld. at 11.
73. Global Privacy Alliance, supra note 69, at 17.
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Thus, the application of Article 4 has proven problematic. As
noted above, the harmonization process has struggled in the face of
the Member States' "margin of appreciation" when implementing the
Directive, and as a result across the EU, Member States' data
protection laws are anything but uniform. This means that
multinational companies which are established in more than one
Member State find that each of their branches are faced with a
different set of local laws with which to comply. Matters may worsen
if the branches wish to transfer data to the parent company. For
example, consider the situation where Company A is established in
France, with subsidiary B established in Italy, subsidiary C
established in Spain, and subsidiary D established in Germany. If the
subsidiaries B, C, & D wish to transfer data to A for processing for
purposes determined by them, A will have to be aware of, and apply,
the differing laws of Italy, Spain, and Germany to the processing for
the respective subsidiaries. Company A will also be unable to
provide its subsidiaries with a uniform set of data protection
guidelines, due to national variations.74
(2) Data Flows External to the EU/EEA
The problems relating to transborder data transfer are further
exacerbated in the case of transfers outside the EU/EEA as the
Directive sets detailed conditions for transfer of personal data to third
party countries, forbidding transfers where, subject to limited
exceptions, non-Member States fail to ensure an "adequate level of
protection" for personal data.75 The Commission has the power to
assess that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection,76
but where no such assessment has occurred, it may be necessary for
data controllers within the EU to use the Directive's other legal bases
for transferring data. The main exceptions provided are when the
data subject has consented to the transfer,77 when the transfer of data
is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data
subject and the controller," and when the transfer is necessary for the
conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of
the data subject between the controller and a third party.79 The
Directive does not make provision for transfers on the basis of a
74. UNICE, Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data
of 24 October 1995: Preliminary Comments, 2 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-
market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/unice-en.pdf (Aug. 30, 2002).
75. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 25(1).
76. Id. at art. 25(6).
77. Id. at art. 26(1).
78. Id.
79. Id.
"balance of interests," i.e., allowing a transfer to be made in
pursuance of the legitimate interests of the exporting data controller
unless it is unwarranted because of prejudice to the rights, freedoms
or legitimate interests of the data subject. Member States may
authorize transfers of personal data to a third country which does not
ensure an adequate level of protection where the data controller
provides adequate safeguards, in particular, via appropriate
contractual clauses."s
A determination of the adequacy of protection of data privacy in
a non-EU/EEA country to which personal data are to be transferred
requires consideration of two criteria. First, the substantive rules that
will apply to the data, and second, the methods of enforcement
available to ensure that compliance with those substantive rules is
enforced. The first of those criteria will be fulfilled if the substantive
rules that apply to the transferee will achieve the same, or a similar,
effect to those contained in the Directive. There are a number of
ways that this might be achieved: national legislation in the
jurisdiction to which the data are transferred; codes of conduct at an
industry or sectoral level; or specific contractual provisions between
the EU/EEA-based transferor and the non-EU/EEA transferee; or
elements of all three."
In this area too, the main problems seem to stem from lack of
clarity in the Directive, lack of consistency between the Member
States in their implementations, and a failure by the Commission to
provide the necessary administrative backup required to ensure that
the system outlined in the Directive would work effectively in
practice. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it comes as no
surprise to find that the key term in Article 25-"adequacy"-is not
defined in the Directive and no clear threshold for achieving
adequacy is provided, and that as a result, it has largely been left to
data controllers to determine, on an ad hoc basis, whether a country's
data protection regime is adequate. The Commission itself has only
managed to issue four adequacy decisions, finding Canada, 2
Hungary,83 Switzerland, ' and the U.S. Safe Harbor85 to meet the EU's
80. Id. at art. 26(2).
81. Id. at art. 25(2).
82. Commission Decision (2002/2/EC) of 20 December 2001 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of
personal data provided by the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act, 2002 O.J. (L2), 13-16 available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_002/_00220020104enOO130016.pdf.
83. Commission Decision (2000/519/EC) of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of
personal data provided in Hungary, 2000 O.J. (L215), 4-6 available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1-215/1-21520000825en00040006.pdf.
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requirements, and has expressed the opinion that it is unlikely to be
in a position to issue many more future decisions due to lack of
resources. This suggests that EU data controllers who wish to export
personal data to other non-EU/EEA states will continue to need to
make use of the Article 26 exceptions. However, these have proven
difficult to use. For example, several Member States are unwilling to
accept employee consent for the transfer of personal data outside the
EU/EEA as they "are of the opinion that employees do not have the
necessary freedom to consent meaningfully to the transfer of such
data because of their inherent dependence on their employers.,16 The
ability of EU data controllers and non-EU data importers to enter
into an agreement to protect data exported to third countries, using
either ad hoc contract clauses or the Commission's Standard
Contractual Clauses,' is also seen as unsatisfactory. Ad hoc contract
clauses more often than not require prior authorization by the data
protection authorities of the Member State from which data are to be
exported, which makes the process time consuming and
cumbersome,' and the Commission's Standard Contractual Clauses
are seen as unworkable for many businesses because of the onerous
nature of their terms.
[T]he Standard Clauses impose significant burdens on business that
go beyond common commercial practice, necessary compliance
incentives, and perhaps most significantly the requirements of
84. Commission Decision (2000/518/EC) of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of
personal data provided in Switzerland, 2000 O.J. (L215), 1-3 available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-ex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1-215/1-21520000825en00010003.pdf.
85. Commission Decision (2000/520/EC) of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the
protection provided by the Safe Harbor privacy principles and related frequently asked
questions issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L215), 7-47
[hereinafter Commission Decision 2000/520/EC]. The Commission made its decision on
the adequacy of the Safe Harbor ruling despite the misgivings of the Article 29 Working
Party and the fact that the European Parliament, in a Resolution dated 5 July 2000,
expressed the view that the arrangement needed to be improved.
86. Global Privacy Alliance, supra note 69, at 6 n.18.
87. Commission Decision (2001/497/EC) of 15 June 2001 on standard contractual
clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, 2001
O.J. (L18), 19-32 available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_181/
118120010704en00190031.pdf; Commission Decision (2002/16/EC) of 27 December 2001
on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established
in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC, 2002 O.J. (L6), 52-63 [hereinafter
Commission Decision 2002/16/EC] available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/
2002/1_006/1_00620020110en00520062.pdf.
88. Commission Decision 2002/16/EC, supra note 87, at 9 (2). The United Kingdom is
one of the few Member States that does not require any prior authorization, but the Office
of the Information Commissioner will review contracts if a complaint is filed against the
data transfer.
Member State law and the Directive. They require more than
adequacy, and even more than equivalence with the Directive.
They also require joint and several liability on the part of the EU
exporter and the non-EU importer, submission to EU jurisdiction
by the importer, audits of the importer by the EU data exporter (or
a selected body) and burdensome constraints on onward transfers."'
Even where there is an "adequacy decision" in relation to a data
importer to whom a data transfer is to be made from an EU Member
State, which should in principle be treated in the same way as a data
transfer within the EU, ' several of the Member States impose further
requirements before permitting transfers:
[T]he Spanish Data Protection Authority requires data transferors
to provide documents that are not related to the transfer and
refuses to include the database concerned in the Spanish Registry
until the transferor does so. This mandate effectively requires de
facto prior approval for data transfers to countries that already
provide an adequate level of protection, something that adequacy
findings, for example, are supposed to preclude. 9'
Even the Safe Harbor agreement negotiated by the Commission with
the U.S. government has been greeted with decidedly mixed views in
Europe, partly because of the relatively low uptake by U.S.
companies,92 and partly because the Safe Harbor excludes U.S.
financial institutions.93
On the basis of the foregoing, it seems a not unreasonable
assessment to suggest that with regard to transborder data flows, the
Directive in its current form, and as implemented by the Member
States, is a far from satisfactory arrangement. Even if one takes the
complaints in the position papers submitted by commercial interests
to the Commission with a proverbial grain of salt, there are clearly
changes that can be made to the existing choice of law/jurisdiction
and data transfer procedures that would signally improve the
89. Global Privacy Alliance, supra note 69, at 7; see also Tite & Lewis, supra note 60,
at 1.
90. See Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, supra note 85, at $ 2 ("The Commission
may find that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection. In that case
personal data may be transferred from the Member States without additional guarantees
being necessary.").
91. Global Privacy Alliance, supra note 69, at 8.
92. At the time of writing, 332 U.S. companies had notified the Department of
Commerce that they adhered to the safe harbor framework developed by the Department
of Commerce in coordination with the European Commission. See U.S. Department of
Commerce Safe Harbor List, at http://www.trade.gov.
93. It should be noted that U.S. financial institutions do not particularly want to be
part of the Safe Harbor framework, as they are lobbying the U.S. government and the
Commission for an adequacy ruling on the basis of existing U.S. financial privacy
legislation, including the amended Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 and the Financial
Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). For criticism of an adequacy
ruling on that basis see Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 113.
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European and international business environment without
significantly impairing the protection provided to data subjects.
Leaving aside the issues of more specific EU definitions of key terms,
and better Member State harmonization, which are discussed above,
there are several administrative advances which could be made.
The issue of jurisdiction and choice of law, particularly with
regard to Internet transactions in personal data, is undoubtedly a
complex issue. With regard to the application of law, given that the
EU is supposed to have harmonized data protection laws, it would
seem reasonable that data controllers, and particularly data
controllers who are part of a group company, should be able to
designate one EEA country where they are formally registered for
data protection purposes-this would also allow for a single
notification, as discussed in the previous section. Additionally, the
role of the geographic location of the processing in determining the
national rules that apply to it seems increasingly dated in terms of
modern business practices. Certainly for data controllers established
in one or more Member States, it would seem more practical for the
processing rules to be based on the location of the controller rather
than on where their servers are based.
While it might be argued that this would lead to a "race to the
bottom," with data controllers choosing to register in the Member
State with the least onerous data protection rules, if the Member
State concerned has a satisfactory implementation of the Directive, as
ascertained by the Commission (and, where necessary, the European
Court of Justice), then the baseline of EU protection will still be
maintained. Such a mechanism would encourage Member States to
harmonize more effectively, because the imposition of national rules
not required by the Directive, or which are significantly more onerous
than the norm, will simply lead to data controllers registering
elsewhere. It might thus be argued that where Member State
authorities charge for registration/notification there will be scope for
the market to determine the cost/benefit of registration in a particular
Member State, i.e., Member States might have a lower fee for
registration/notification but stricter rules, and vice versa.
Another argument is that the law governing the primary
relationship between the data controller and the data subject should
also be the law applicable to any transborder data flow resulting from
that relationship:
[I]f Dutch law governs the employment contract between a Dutch
multinational and an employee in France, why should French law
cover the data flows between France and The Netherlands while
those data flows are only incidental to the employment
relationship?94
This arrangement, too, has its merits for data controllers established
within the EEA, by virtue of simplifying their data protection
arrangements.
Where the data controller is not established in any EEA state,
but processes non-EEA related personal data within an EEA state, it
is tempting to argue that its activities should not be regulated by EU
data protection law:
[A] Hong Kong company based in Hong Kong using a server which
happens to be based in Belgium to process data about its Hong
Kong employees should be clearly excluded from the provisions of
the Directive.95
However, this approach would appear to weaken the validity of the
EU's own approach to transborder data flows, with the EU
demanding that EU personal data be processed in accordance with
the Directive wherever in the world it is transferred, while permitting
lesser, or no protection, for other nation's citizens' data if it is
processed in the EEA by a non-EEA established controller. If the
EU, as stated in the Directive's recitals, is concerned that "that the
fundamental rights of individuals should be safeguarded," it would
seem inconsistent to differentiate between the protection afforded an
EU citizen's, and a non-EU citizen's, personal data processed in the
EU.
Where the data controller is not established in any EEA state,
but collects personal data from EU citizens, for example, by the use
of cookies, it seems difficult to justify the imposition of EU data
protection law by virtue of Article 4(1)(c) simply because the
controller uses "equipment" or "means," such as a data subject's PC,
within the EU to collect personal data. While it is clear that Article
4(1)(c) is designed to prevent evasion or circumvention of EU data
protection laws by relocation outside the EU/EEA, it may be that a
more rigorous test is required to narrow the scope of the Article to a
more practical set of targets, for example, a requirement that the data
controller intentionally targets EU residents for data collection.96
Additionally, there seems little justification for applying EU law
under Article 4(1)(c) to data controllers established in countries that
have been deemed adequate by the Commission, when the national
laws of those countries would provide the necessary protection for
data subjects.97
94. The European Privacy Officers' Forum, supra note 37, at 7.
95. Confederation of British Industry, supra note 52, at 6.
96. Covington & Burling, supra note 51, at 6.
97. The European Privacy Officers' Forum, supra note 37, at 7.
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Given the financial difficulties facing the Commission with
regard to providing "adequacy" decisions for non-EU/EEA states,
and the litany of problems that data controllers who seek to use the
Article 26 exemptions provide, it would seem that there is
considerable scope for rationalizing transborder data flows to non-
EU/EEA countries.
One suggestion has been to make provision for transfers on the
basis of the "balance of interests," i.e., when the transfer is necessary
for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller
or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except
where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection.98
Given that the exporting data controller will be responsible if the
transfer results in prejudice to the data subject, it is arguable that the
data controller will take this into account when determining the
conditions under which a transfer is made. This argument, which is
based upon an analogy with the "balance of interests" test for data
processing of non-sensitive data under Article 7(f) of the Directive,
would seem to overlook the difference in the degree of control that
can be exerted by a data subject over the personal data during Article
7 processing and after Article 26 transfer. Analysis of Article 8 and
Article 26 suggests that the drafters of the Directive were concerned
about providing more extensive protections for both sensitive data
and data to be transferred out of the EU/EEA. This may well have
been predicated on the difficulty for data subjects in reasserting
control over their personal data after transborder transfer, as opposed
to just the possibility of being awarded damages for distress and/or
damage following unlawful processing. That having been said, the
extent to which EU exporting data controllers already have to make
decisions about the adequacy of data protection regimes in third party
nations, and make administrative and contractual provisions
accordingly, suggests that the element of discretion that such a
"balance of interests" provision might introduce might not, in
practice, be significantly greater than already exists.
The removal of procedures additional to the measures provided
for in the Directive would also allow for more efficient data flows.
For example, where a state or administrative mechanism (e.g., the
Safe Harbor Agreement) is the subject of an adequacy decision by
the Commission, Member State data protection authorities should
not require further procedures to be followed and should
98. Id. at 10; see also Clifford Chance Submission to the European Commission:




automatically authorize transfers to companies within such states or
mechanisms. Equally, where the Commission approves standard
contractual terms for the transfer of personal data, contracts using
such standard contractual terms should not be subject to further
national regulation and inspection.
With regard to the Commission's Standard Contractual Clauses,
a number of the parties who submitted position papers suggested that
these were too precisely detailed and thus relatively inflexible, and
that other approaches would be more appropriate to the commercial
environment. Other approaches suggested included: that the
Standard Contractual Clauses should be issued as guidance only, thus
allowing them to be adapted for particular circumstances and
commercial needs;99 that the Commission might approve alternative
contracts-proffered, for example, by business organizations-for
EU-wide use; ° or that a set of contractual terms meeting the
requirements of the data protection authorities in one Member State
would be granted "mutual recognition" in all other Member States."'
The first suggestion would probably not help matters unduly, as if
data controllers were to be permitted to treat the Standard
Contractual Clauses as guidance, this would almost certainly mean
that many national data protection authorities would wish to
maintain, or increase, their current level of oversight and approval.
The second suggestion might be of more value, except for the fact
that the Commission is unlikely to want to accept the workload that it
would entail. The final suggestion would appear to be the most
efficient approach to the problem, although given that it is essentially
another form of harmonizing mechanism, this is probably not
surprising.
Overall, while some of the suggestions received from commercial
organizations clearly would be problematic, in that their aim would
appear to be more to lower the data protection baseline that currently
exists in the EU, rather than to provide more efficient ways of
attaining the current level of protection, there have been a number of
measures suggested which would signally improve the lot of EU data
controllers needing to transfer personal data between EU/EEA states
and to states outside the EU/EEA, without unduly eroding that
baseline, and that the Commission and Member States could adopt
without requiring profound changes in the Directive or national
legislation.
99. Tite & Lewis, supra note 60, at 2.
100. Confederation of British Industry, supra note 52, at 14.
101. Tite & Lewis, supra note 60, at 2-3.
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C. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
While the Commission has expressed both its hope that
technological solutions for data privacy will prove useful in attaining
the aims of the Directive, and its intention to promote PETs, there
remains considerable disagreement as to what actually constitutes a
privacy enhancing technology."" A relatively broad definition is:
"Privacy-enhancing technologies are protocols, standards, and tools
that directly assist in protecting privacy, minimizing the collection of
personally identifiable information, and when possible, eliminating
the collection of personally identifiable information." ' 3
With regard to the suggested role of PETs in providing an
alternative avenue for enforcing the concepts contained in the
Directive, the key issue is probably the extent to which any proposed
technology can be demonstrated to accurately reflect those concepts
rather than offer alternative weaker data subject controls over their
personal data. Thus, the fact that a technology improves the
efficiency of data processing would be of lesser importance than that
it could provide some increased element of anonymity or
pseudonymity in data subject/data controller transactions.
Member States' regulatory agencies are thus likely to
differentiate in this regard between those technologies that
implement fair information practices ("FIPs") and those which
implement more basic "notice and choice" policies; as discussed
elsewhere, it is debatable if the latter should in fact be properly
considered as PETs at all."' Technologies like P3P 5 have been
bruited as PETs, but even leaving aside problems such as the
complexity of the P3P protocol, and its perceived data user (and data
controller) unfriendliness, a key problem with P3P is that as it is
currently implemented in web browsers, like Internet Explorer 6, it
102. John J. Borking & Charles D. Raab, Laws, PETs and Other Technologies for
Privacy Protection 2001 J. OF INFO., LAW & TECH. 1 at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk.
103. Ruchika Agrawal, Why is P3P Not a PET?, $ 2.1, at http://www.w3.org/2002/p3p-
ws/pp/epic.pdf (Nov. 12-13, 2002). Agrawal cites "blind" digital signatures, anonymous
remailers and web-surfing anonymizers as examples of true PETs. Id. at 2.2.
104. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What
Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1.
105. P3P is an
industry-standard XML-based language that enables an automatic "privacy
handshake" between a browser and a web site or cookie ... [It] is sponsored by
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [and] provides web site operators with
a standardized XML-based language for writing proxies for privacy policies that
can be automatically retrieved and interpreted by P3P-enabled web browsers and
other user agents.
James A. Harvey & Karen M. Sanzaro, P3P and IE 6: Raising More Privacy Issues Than
They Resolve?, GIGALAW (Feb. 2002), at http://www.gigalaw.com; see also Platform for
Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, at http://www.w3.org/P3P.
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simply allows users to specify privacy preferences which the browser
can then use to read a website's privacy policy (when that policy is
rendered into machine readable form by encoding it in XML format)
to determine whether the website policy satisfies the user's privacy
requirements. If the policy does not meet the user's requirement, the
browser will warn the user.
While in principle, the adoption of such technology by a major
software company like Microsoft may be seen as a step forward, P3P
has been met with considerable skepticism by both European data
protection regulators, and by the very commercial entities that might
be expected to use it. From the companies' point of view, P3P is both
expensive to initially implement, and it requires considerable effort
and resource to keep larger websites up-to-date; it is also not entirely
clear what companies are letting themselves in for in terms of their
accountability for statements made in their P3P policy, as "the
specification's 'vocabulary' isn't rich enough to allow exact
translations of written data privacy policies into an XML-based
format that can be read by Web browsers and compared against the
preferences set by individual users."" As a result, companies would
prefer that P3P statements and compact policies not be considered
legally binding documents.'7
From the European regulators' perspective, P3P is problematic
in that it does not promote a minimum set of privacy or security
standards that websites should follow; its use does not guarantee
compliance with Article 10 and 11 of the Directive with regard to
information to be provided to the data subject; it does not provide an
enforcement mechanism to ensure that data controllers are doing
what their P3P policies indicate; and given the average user's
unwillingness to change default browser settings, the absence of an
default set of European user preferences keyed to the EU Directive
means that many users would not in fact benefit from the degree of
transparency that P3P can provide."'8
Indeed, if one accepts the definition of a PET above, this
iteration of P3P would appear to meet none of the basic
requirements, although the Commission appears to feel that if it is
106. Patrick Thibodeau, P3P Supporters Struggle to Increase Adoption of Data Privacy
Standard, COMPUTERWORLD 20 (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.computerworld.com.
107. Banking Industry Technology Secretariat, Position Paper: W3C Workshop on the
Future of P3P at http://www.w3.org/2002/p3p-ws/pp/bits.pdf (Nov. 12-13, 2002).
108. Diana Alonso Bias, The future of P3P: Issues to be addressed in order to allow
data controllers using P3P to be compliant with the EU Data Protection Directive at
http://www.w3.org (Nov. 12-13, 2002); see also Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/98:
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard (OPS), XV
D/5032/98 (WP 11) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/
1998/wpll-en.pdf (June 16, 1998) [hereinafter Art. 29 Working Party].
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used within a suitable regulatory framework, it may be of use in
helping individuals manage their online privacy choices, and might
therefore be seen to help data controllers comply with their
obligations under the Directive to ensure that their processing is
transparent to the data subject."°
Future development of P3P may involve a more involved set of
"negotiation facilities" to let websites interact with consumers, and
potentially provide capabilities such as the ability to offer coupons for
personal data."' This suggest that the future of P3P lies as a
"marketplace mechanism" and not a "protection mechanism." In
other words, it would facilitate the trading of personal information
more readily than it enhanced the options available to data subjects
to control their data. While some might see P3P as an aid to privacy:
"A world without P3P is a world with less control over privacy, a
world with P3P is a world with more control over privacy.""
From the perspective of the DPD and FIPs, a world with P3P in that
form is potentially a world with increasing amounts of personal data
being released by data subjects without a clear understanding of the
purpose for the collection by data controllers; a world where the
temptation inevitably is to request personal data "in exchange" for
information or services;. and a world where, in the absence of a
suitable oversight and enforcement agency, the data subject may not
be able to enforce the automated privacy agreement if it is breached,
or may not be aware of, or be notified about, the mechanisms for
accessing the FIPs. Indeed, a world with P3P may already be a world
where both data subject and data controller are in the dark about
what is actually being agreed about the collection and use of personal
data:
[S]ince P3P is primarily a technical solution, there is the all-too-
likely possibility that webmasters simply will implement P3P
policies at the web site as necessary to ensure that the site continues
to function properly, without first receiving input from the
appropriate legal and business contacts. Therefore, with P3P, there
may be an increased risk that a company will face liability for
discrepancies between and among their non-P3P policies, their P3P
policies and their actual practices."
At present, the debate about PETs does not appear to have
progressed significantly from the position in the late 1990s, although
109. Diana Alonso Bias, supra note 108.
110. See Thibodeau, supra note 106.
111. Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future
of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 762 (1999).
112. See, e.g., the New York Times Registration page which requests information about
employment and household income. See also Art. 29 Working Party, supra note 108.
113. Harvey & Sanzaro, supra note 105; see also Scot Hacker, P3P in 1E6: Frustrating
Failure, O'REILLY NETWORK (June 7, 2002), at http://www.oreillynet.com.
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there have been some lively, if only tangentially relevant in privacy
terms, side-debates about the role of open source and proprietary
software in this area. The discussion at the Workshop on
Developments in the Information Society: Internet and Privacy
Enhancing Technologies at the Commission's Conference in Sept-
Oct 2002 certainly appeared to have great difficulties agreeing on
what a PET might be, and the panel of speakers appeared largely split
between those favoring a "notice and choice" or "market
mechanism" approach and those who felt that any technology that
failed to uphold the FIPs might at best be privacy neutral, but was
more likely to be a potentially privacy intrusive technology ("PIT").
One paper from a speaker who appeared to fall into the "notice
and choice" or "market mechanism" camp was based on the concept
of "user empowerment," which was posited as a hybrid proposal.
This accepted that a baseline regulation for privacy rights was
probably necessary, but went on to argue that above that baseline the
most efficient method of dealing with personal data was to let users
set their own privacy preferences. The need for "user empowerment"
was premised upon the fact that "a regulatory regime that requires all
measures to be taken by the company collecting and processing data
has the perverse effect of imposing costs on users,' 114 those costs
being:
A loss of consumer surplus... For example, a number of free e-
mail services reply on the ability to deliver targeted advertising to
particular users based on personal information gathered about
them. If, to protect privacy, the ability of companies to gather and
process this information is made too cumbersome, these services
will disappear, and users will have no option but to pay for e-mail
services this would... pric[e] low-income users out of the Internet
market entirely, reducing Internet penetration....
The opportunity cost of not having the service reflect the user's
particular privacy preferences. To the extent that websites adopt
one-size-fits-all to comply with privacy laws, an opportunity cost is
imposed on those users who have different preferences, and would
choose to share more (or less) personal data ... [T]he
suggestion.., that fully informed and freely given user consent is
not a sufficient basis on which to process data, but that there must
also be a legitimate purpose (however defined) for the processing,
risks imposing this opportunity cost on users who otherwise would
have consented to the processing of their data."'
114. Jason Albert, Privacy on the Internet: Protecting and Empowering Users, 1 at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/lawreport/albert-en.pdf (Sept.
2002).
115. Id. at 1-2.
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While both these arguments have some attractions, notably for those
with a Posnerian frame of reference, 16 it is not particularly convincing
when viewed from the European perspective. The first example is
unconvincing, firstly because it is premised on a "privacy as
commodity" basis, as opposed to a "privacy as a fundamental right"
basis, and secondly, because it sets up a scenario which requires
"personal data" where anonymous or pseudonymous data might
serve as well. It also posits that processing the information lawfully in
such circumstances might be "too cumbersome" without suggesting
why or how, and assumes that, in the absence of a permitted trade in
personal data, there are no other mechanisms available to support
free or low cost e-mail services for low-income users. Despite the
balance of the example being weighted so heavily against privacy
protection, there appears to be no obvious evidence that the
suggested outcome would necessarily be the case.
The second example, is also premised on the "privacy as
commodity," and in essence seems to claim that privacy law
restrictions amount to an undue interference in "the market."
However, there are many potential markets where individuals have
items to trade, and could do so on the basis of fully informed and
freely given consent, but are prevented from doing so by national
laws. For example, if I set up a donor service whereby individuals
could obtain a car in exchange for their duplicate organs, such as
kidneys, or for other body parts such as a quantity of blood, I might
be offering a new and innovative service, and one where individuals
could barter their organs with fully informed and freely given
consent, but in many countries, even though an individual might be
considered to "own" his body, such a sale would be illegal, because
the trade in certain items is considered socially undesirable, even
where an individual might perfectly legally donate an organ for free.
Just because there could be a market does not mean that there should
be a market."7 In any case, the example seems confused, for it seems
to suggest that fully informed and freely given user consent should be
capable of justifying illegitimate or illegal purposes. Additionally,
neither example seems to deal well with the issue of whether what
may be seen as "compelled consent" on economic grounds, (i.e.,
"provide personal data or have no service"), in fact equates with the
interpretation of "consent" in terms of privacy as a human right, the
basis on which the Directive is supposedly founded (i.e.,
116. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, REGULATION 19-26
(May/June 1978).
117. For further discussion of the concept of market inalienability, see Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); but cf. Walter Block, Market Inalienability Once
Again: Reply to Radin, 22 THOMAS JEFFERSON L.J. 37 (1999).
"fundamental rights should not be subject to enforced
commoditization").
Probably the toughest test that any potentially privacy enhancing
technology currently faces in the EU is the ingrained suspicion that
such technologies are simply a method of subverting the explicit
protection granted by the Directive. The initial aggressive
championing of P3P and other technical platforms for privacy
protection as an alternative, as opposed to a supplement, to data
protection legislation, by parties opposed to formal regulation, has
resulted in something of a backlash against privacy technologies
generally, particularly as the initial expansive claims of the abilities of
some of the early technologies have gradually run out of steam. It
would be wrong, however, to dismiss such technologies out of hand.
When properly used, and within the framework of formal regulation,
there are an array of potential technologies which may prove
functional, both in enabling data controllers to meet some of their
obligations under the Directive, and in providing data subjects with a
better understanding of the legal and technical environments which
affect their privacy rights. In general, it would seem that, with regard
to the Commission's suggestion that PETs might be used as part of
the EU data privacy regime:
" a clear definition of what a PET actually is will be required, and it
is suggested that any definition should have regard not to the
concepts of "notice and choice," but rather to the concepts
contained in the FIPs; and
" while PETs have a role to play within a regulatory-based regime,
they should continue to be viewed as supplementary to it, rather
than effective substitutes for all or part of that regime.
D. Self-Regulation and Codes of Practice
The issue of self-regulation is a "hot button" topic for both sides
of the data privacy debate. There is deep suspicion amongst privacy
advocates that most proposals put forward by business for self-
regulatory schemes are simply conspiracies to deter effective privacy
enforcement by means of legislative rules and independent oversight.
On the other hand, businesses see self-regulation as being a much
more flexible approach to ensuring privacy protection, as it can be
more easily adapted to changing commercial and technical
environments, and arguably administered more effectively by privacy
officers who are closer to the point of processing. In their view,
formal privacy regulation is often difficult to comply adequately with
due to lack of clarity, precision and purpose; involves
overburdensome and purposeless formalities; and is often only
utilized by those with existing grievances.
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On the evidence, both sides have legitimate points. The history
of industry self-regulation is littered with examples of abuses and
failures."' However, there are some apparent success stories, and, if
self-regulation is carried out scrupulously, significant advantages can
accrue both to society and to the self-regulated businesses."9 I have
argued elsewhere 20 that with regard to data privacy, self-regulation in
isolation from a baseline of formal state regulation is likely to fail for
a variety of reasons:
" Self-regulatory standards for privacy protection are often set in an
unaccountable and non-democratic manner by business alone or
in combination with NGOs. In such fora, it is perhaps
unsurprising that "inconvenient" but vital standards such as rights
of access to personal data, credible oversight and enforcement
mechanisms, and legal redress for the individual may not be
included, or are weakened by exceptions to the point where they
are meaningless.
" Self-regulatory standards are often unevenly adopted within and
across industries and because they are by definition voluntary,
despite good intentions self-regulation can thus come to mean no
regulation. At that point, the standards become little more than
misleading public relations material designed to soothe public
concerns without actually addressing problems.
" Self-regulation can be used by industry to co-opt critics, minimize
justifiable litigation, and avoid government regulation even when
it is needed. Highly hyped but legally unenforceable privacy
policies are no substitute for rights of access to personal data,
credible oversight and enforcement mechanisms, and legal redress
for the individual.
" Because there is no baseline of privacy protection, a multiplicity
of self regulatory initiatives may develop, allowing companies to
pick and choose the standards they are willing to adhere to.
Additionally, self-regulatory certification systems (such as web
seals) can be confusing for consumers and buyers, particularly
where there are difficulties in determining the veracity or value of
competing systems-the temptation is to treat them all as of equal
118. For the checkered history of the online industry body, TRUSTe, see Charlesworth,
supra note 20, at 104-05.
119. One example appears to be the development of codes of business ethics in the
areas of child labor and sweatshops. See Bureau of International Labor Affairs, The
Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor
Problem? at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/apparel/apparel.pdf; see also Lance
Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663-68 (1995).
120. Andrew Charlesworth, Clash of the Data Titans: US and EU Data Privacy
Regulation, 6 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 253,273-74 (2000).
value or worthlessness. Above all, multiple initiatives mean a
lack of transparency about personal data processing activities on
the part of data users that is an essential part of meaningful data
privacy rules.
Yet, the fact that self-regulation may fail to provide an adequate
level of protection in the absence of a legislative baseline for data
privacy does not mean that there is no place for self-regulation within
the EU privacy regime. As noted above, some of the suggested
solutions to the difficulties faced by the Member States with regard to
transborder data flows may well best be tackled by self-regulatory
initiatives. Additionally, in the UK, the Office of the Information
Commissioner ("OIC") has (in large part due to underfunding and
understaffing) long taken the approach that a key part of the UK data
privacy regime would be the promotion of the use of sectoral policies
and codes of practice, rather than a rigid scheme of enforcement. 2' It
is noticeable when discussing the activities of national data protection
agencies with representatives of international businesses that the UK
OIC is frequently praised for its constructive and pragmatic approach
to the application of data protection laws. This is not to say that the
UK OIC is lax in its enforcement of the law, or that UK national
transposition of the DPD resulted in significantly weaker national
legislation. Rather, the process of consultation and discussion related
to the development of sectoral polices and codes of practice has
meant that the staff of the OIC are well placed to advise on effective
privacy protection mechanisms, and are knowledgeable about the
practical difficulties which face national and international businesses.
The state of play with regard to self regulatory schemes in the
EU appears to have matured somewhat, with less direct calls for what
might be considered PR-enhancing, self-regulatory devices, such as
web privacy seals, amongst European companies, '22 and more
121. See, e.g., the UK Further and Higher Education Code of Practice on Data
Protection, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/
bipar-en.pdf.
122. Although support remains for such devices, notably a European Privacy Seal
awarded if a website followed best data protection practice. See Allen & Overy, supra
note 42, at 3; International Federation of Insurance Intermediaries, Answers to the
European Commission Questionnaire for the data controllers on the implementation of
the Data Protection Directive, 3 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/privacy/
docs/lawreport/paper/bipar.en.pdf (Sept. 23, 2002). Interestingly, the development of
such a European Privacy Seal was opposed by the U.S. Council for International Business:
USCIB supports codes of conduct and seal programs that are voluntary and
market-driven. It is important to note that privacy seals are working effectively
in the U.S.... However, an EU government developed seal program would fail
to account for the existing privacy and consumer trust initiatives that exist today
and could actually undermine competitiveness and decrease the voluntary nature
of codes of conduct.
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requests for national, and possibly EU-wide codes of conduct. It
seems that the major stumbling block to this type of development is
the fact that, despite the Directive providing for the drawing up of
Codes of Conduct at the national level,1 23 and providing an oversight
mechanism for conformity of EU-level Codes with national
legislation,12 it provides neither the Commission nor the Member
States with the power to approve EU-wide Codes of Conduct for
particular sectors or enterprises, or any administrative mechanism by
which this might occur. This has led to the growth of often
incompatible national codes of practice for particular sectors. In
contrast, EU-wide Codes of Conduct could be used as harmonizing
tools, by virtue of Commission or Member State approval permitting
mutual recognition of a Code across the Member States.26
As with its desire to keep an open mind on the role of PETs, the
Commission's move to explore a wider role for self-regulation as a
facilitative device for the effective implementation of a harmonized
EU regulatory framework is a positive step towards achieving a
solution that satisfies both the demands of EU citizens for adequate
protection of their personal data, and the need of commercial
organizations to have clear guidance about good practice. It is
important, however, that the Commission resists the undoubted
pressure to allow self-regulatory practices to displace or replace the
legislative protections afforded to personal data in the EU.
Conclusion-Optimizing Enforcement
There is little doubt that the process of harmonizing the laws of
the fifteen Member States has a long way to go before EU data
protection law reaches the point where the phrase E Pluribus Unum
could truly apply. There may be more unity of purpose between the
Member States in 2003 than there was in 1995, but there remain
significant differences of interpretation and administrative practice.
In that regard, the Commission's decision to hold such a wide-ranging
review of the implementation of the Directive appears far from hasty.
USCIB Comments for the Review of the E.U. General Data Protection Directive
(95/46/EC), 4 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketlprivacy/docs/lawreport/paper/
uscib-en.pdf (July 30, 2002). Leaving aside the question of whom U.S. privacy seals are
"working effectively" for, it is difficult to see why a government backed seal, which would
surely carry more weight with consumers, would have such a deleterious effect on
competition and voluntary codes of practice.
123. DPD, supra note 2, at art. 27(1)-(2).
124. Id. at art. 27(3).
125. Association of Consumer Credit Information Suppliers, Data Protection Directive
(95/46), 5 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketprivacy/docs/lawreport/paper/
accis en.pdf (Aug. 6, 2002).
126. Citigroup, supra note 48, at 6.
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Both the technological and commercial environments have changed
considerably, and in many cases so have the attitudes of governments
and commercial organizations towards the utility of privacy
regulation. Thus, while there are significant areas where citizens,
commercial organizations, regulators, and governments are still
engaged in adversarial struggles over the nature and scope of
regulation, in many others the main issue now is how best to reach a
commonly agreed upon goal.
Many of the suggestions with regard to administrative practices
and transborder data flows appear both practical and, in principle at
least, either privacy enhancing, or at worst privacy neutral. Where
national data authorities can agree on co-operative measures, such as
single point notification or the use of Chief Privacy Officers instead of
notification, mutual recognition of codes of practice and sectoral
policies, and consistent interpretation of statutory definitions, these
should be actively pursued and encouraged. Redundant bureaucracy
should ideally be excised. This might include the removal of the
whole process of notification to national authorities, if no compelling
argument for retaining it can be mustered.
In the longer term, the primary aim of national DP authorities
should increasingly focus on guidance rather than enforcement,
although there will remain an obvious role for enforcement in some
areas. Where enforcement is an issue, all national authorities should
have their enforcement powers brought into line with those of other
Member States. For example, the UK OIC should be granted an
independent power of data audit or site inspection, with or without
the consent of the data controller, rather than the limited powers
currently held under the UK Data Protection Act 1998.2
Supplemental activities to the legislative framework should be
examined, and where necessary, given formal sanction. In this
context, the setting of audit standards and the granting of audit
accreditation to independent bodies by Member States will be an
essential step towards incorporating data protection practices ever
more firmly into the organizational ethos of commercial entities.
However, at the same time, measures which seek to reduce the
data privacy baseline should continue to be actively resisted, whether
these take the form of proposals to replace legislative protections by
self-regulatory mechanisms, or by use of new technological
mechanisms. The EU privacy baseline must continue to be measured
against the Fair Information Principles and should not be permitted
to be undercut by market-based privacy interpretations. Indeed, if
127. Andrew Charlesworth, Implementing the European Union Data Protection
Directive 1995 in UK Law: The Data Protection Act 1998, 16 Gov'T INFO. Q. 203, 226
(1999).
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the price for the rapid attainment of a more complete harmonization
of EU data protection law is to be a significant weakening of that data
privacy baseline, then perhaps the Member States' Ex Uno Plures
approach to its application might inadvertently prove to be the best
model for EU citizens.

